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Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars
Jason Kanter* and Robin Feldman**
Congress recently passed the Biosimilars Act in an attempt to replicate the success that
generic small molecule drugs have enjoyed under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The
Biosimilars Act provides a pathway for biosimilars to achieve quicker and less expensive
FDA approval than what is required for a new biopharmaceutical. There is, however,
greater uncertainty and cost associated with achieving the coveted biosimilarity status.
This reflects the complex production methods of biopharmaceuticals, along with the
many factors that can alter the structure and function of such drugs.
This Article analyzes the Biosimilars Act and the draft guidances recently released by the
FDA. The Article identifies areas of uncertainty and other aspects of the current regime
that create disincentives for the development of biosimilars, as well as suggesting
improvements. If we are serious about reducing the price of biological drugs and
encouraging the creation of biosimilars, we will need to develop a more effective pathway
for approval. This is no easy task. The greater risks associated with the production of
biosimilars should prompt a fair degree of caution in establishing the pathway for
approval. Balancing consumer safety with appropriate market incentives is a delicate
mission. Nevertheless, under the current regime, we risk the possibility that companies
will focus on developing so-called biodifferents and biobetters (new drugs designed to
mimic an existing biological drug), completely forgoing the opportunity to develop
biosimilars.
The loser, of course, is the consumer. It is doubtful that biobetters and biosimilars will
have the same price-lowering effects as generics. These drugs will be patented, creating
full exclusivity in the market, and prices will remain high in the biological drug space. It
would be unfortunate if the tremendous energy and creativity invested in designing and
implementing the Biosimilars Act were to have very little effect in the long run.

* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. 2012; Northwestern University,
M.S. 2008; University of California, Los Angeles, B.S. 2007.
** Professor of Law and Director of the Law and Bioscience Project, University of California,
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Introduction
Modern small molecule pharmaceuticals cost a great deal of money to
1
research and produce, and a great deal more to obtain FDA approval. As
a result, these pharmaceuticals often enter the consumer market at a
considerable markup in order to recover investment costs. However, when
the patents covering a pharmaceutical expire, generic versions of the drug
rapidly enter the marketplace, increasing competition and greatly lowering
2
costs to the average consumer. The development of generic small
molecule drugs has been encouraged through legislation such as the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act—also known as the
“Hatch-Waxman Act.” The legislation provides financial incentives and
protections for generic drug manufacturers that attempt to enter the
3
market and challenge a brand-drug’s patents. While this system is far from
perfect, it has maintained a balance between incentivizing new drug
development and encouraging the entry of generics into the market.
In contrast, biopharmaceuticals greatly differ from their small
molecule cousins. Biopharmaceuticals are far more complex, which
increases the costs associated with drug development and FDA
4
approval. Most biopharmaceuticals are proteins, although the category
includes other biological products such as viruses or viral therapeutics,
toxins, antitoxins, vaccines, blood, blood components, and allergenic
5
products. Given the complexity of these products, it is more difficult to
6
determine whether one biological drug is actually identical to another.
Small structural or functional differences may exist that are undetectable
7
with modern scientific tools. Therefore, the term “generic” does not
currently apply to biological drugs copied from an original biologic.
8
Rather, such copies are referred to as biosimilars, or follow-on biologics.

1. See PhRMA, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2011, 14–15 (2011); Christopher P. Adams
& Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?,
25 Health Aff. 420, 424–25 (2006); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates
of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151, 165 (2003).
2. See Henry Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods
in Pharmaceuticals, 28 Managerial & Decision Econ. 491, 501 (2007).
3. See Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2007)); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006) (submission of an abbreviated new drug application
is an artificial act of infringement, allowing for lawsuits over patent validity without the risk of money
damages typically associated with other forms of infringement).
4. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech
Different?, 28 Managerial & Decision Econ. 469, 472 (2007).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2006).
6. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Scientific Considerations in
Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product 4–6 (2012) [hereinafter FDA, Scientific
Considerations].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
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Congress recently approved the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009 (“Biosimilars Act”) in an attempt to replicate its
9
small molecule generics success in the biopharmaceutical market. This
legislation provides a pathway for biosimilars to achieve quicker and less
expensive FDA approval than what is required for a new
10
biopharmaceutical. However, there is greater uncertainty and cost
11
associated with achieving the coveted biosimilarity status. This reflects
the complex production methods of biopharmaceuticals, along with the
12
many factors that can alter the structure and function of such drugs.
To combat some of the uncertainties in the Biosimilars Act, the
13
FDA released several draft guidances in February 2012. These
guidances provide scientific and quality considerations in demonstrating
biosimilarity. They outline the FDA’s “totality of the evidence”
approach to biosimilar approval and provide a method for the
14
characterization of proposed biosimilars.
While the Biosimilars Act and its associated guidelines indicate that
the approval process for biosimilars will be easier and less costly than
that of a pioneer biopharmaceutical drug, they provide few clear
parameters for a biosimilar manufacturer to rely on, give only a vague
outline for FDA approval requirements, and imply that the biosimilar
approval process will be far more expensive and time consuming than
that of generic small molecule drugs. Given the greater costs and
increased uncertainty associated with biosimilar approval, investment in
the development of such drugs will likely be inhibited, resulting in lower
availability of biosimilars and thus higher costs to consumers. While
some uncertainty and additional costs are inevitable given today’s
scientific tools, the biosimilar market would benefit from clearer, more
quantitative parameters in future Biosimilars Act guidances, better
litigation procedures under the Biosimilars Act, and greater legislative
15
exclusivity protections of biosimilar manufacturers.

9. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k). Small molecule generic drugs have become commonplace in the
United States, with annual sales greater than $51 billion. David Harding, Gaining Market Share in
the Generic Industry Through Acquisitions and Partnerships 2 (2010).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k).
11. FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 4–6.
12. Id.
13. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Quality Considerations in Demonstrating
Biosimilarity to a Reference Protein Product 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter FDA, Quality
Considerations]; FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 4–6. See generally Food & Drug
Admin., Guidance for Industry: Biosimilars: Questions and Answers Regarding Implementation
of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (2012) [hereinafter FDA,
Biosimilars].
14. FDA, Quality Considerations, supra note 13, at 6; FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra
note 6, at 8.
15. Since the passage of Hatch-Waxman in 1984, Congress has provided generic drug applicants
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This Article analyzes the Biosimilars Act and the draft guidances,
identifying areas of uncertainty and other aspects of the current regime
that create disincentives for the development of biosimilars. If we are
serious about reducing the price of biological drugs and encouraging the
creation of biosimilars, we will need to develop a more effective pathway
for approval. This is no easy task. The greater risks associated with the
production of biosimilars should prompt a fair degree of caution in
establishing the pathway for approval. Balancing consumer safety with
appropriate market incentives is a delicate mission. Nevertheless, under
the current regime, companies are more likely to focus on the
development of so-called biodifferents and biobetters (new drugs
designed to mimic an existing biological drug), completely forgoing the
opportunity to develop biosimilars. Biodifferents are drugs that are
distinct from the FDA-approved biologic, and biobetters are a subset of
biodifferents that have better efficacy than the FDA-approved biologic.
Biodifferents and biobetters go through the same regulatory approval
process as original biopharmaceutical drugs. Should companies choose to
develop biodifferents and biobetters rather than biosimilars, the exercise
of creating the legislative and regulatory structure for biosimilars will
have been largely in vain.

I. Generic Approval Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
Congress’ treatment of small molecule generics and the relative
success of the generic market serve as important points of comparison
when evaluating the incentives presented under the Biosimilars Act. In
1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
16
Restoration Act, often referred to as the “Hatch-Waxman Act.” The
Hatch-Waxman Act provides for the submission of Abbreviated New
Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) seeking approval of generic versions of
17
established drugs. This process allows generic drug manufacturers to
rely on safety and efficacy data previously submitted to the FDA by a
reference product sponsor if the generic applicant can provide enough
evidence to show that its drug is sufficiently identical to the reference
18
drug. The FDA’s guidances regarding the Hatch-Waxman Act are fairly
specific, and define a generic drug to be identical to the original drug

with a 180-day exclusivity period as an incentive for the generic drug manufacturers to challenge
patents. David E. Korn et al., A New History and Discussion of 180-Day Exclusivity, 64 Food & Drug
L.J. 335, 335 (2009).
16. See Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2007)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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when pharmacokinetic studies show that the generic’s average
19
bioequivalence falls within an 80–125% range.
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides an opportunity for generic
manufacturers to challenge patents that protect a brand drug without
exposing the generics to hefty damages from actually producing and selling
20
a version of the patented drug. It allows generic manufacturers to
artificially infringe a brand manufacturer’s patents, avoiding the accrual of
actual damages and forcing the brand manufacturers to choose either to
21
initiate a lawsuit or forfeit their rights to do so in the future. Additionally,
Hatch-Waxman provides a 180-day period of exclusivity to the first generic
manufacturer that submits an ANDA artificially infringing a reference
product’s patents, thus incentivizing patent challenges and generic entry
22
into the market.
To balance the additional pressure on brand-name manufacturers,
Hatch-Waxman creates a period of brand exclusivity, preventing
23
approval of generic drugs until five years after brand approval.
Furthermore, Hatch-Waxman provides patent term restoration to brandname manufacturers, which extends the lifetime of patents covering
drugs that obtain FDA approval through the Investigational New Drug
24
and New Drug Application processes.
The Hatch-Waxman Act has been relatively successful in creating a
system that is well defined for investors, incentivizing both new drug
development and generic entry. For example, the market share of
generic drugs has risen from nineteen percent of all pharmaceutical sales

19. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Bioavailability and Bioequivalence
Studies for Orally Administered Drug Products—General Considerations 20 (2003); see James
D. Henderson & Richard H. Esham, Generic Substitution: Issues for Problematic Drugs, 94 S. Med. J.
16, 20 (2001) (“Typically, the data from a single-dose, 2-way crossover bioavailability study are
analyzed using a complex statistical model that allows evaluation of the least squares means of the
bioavailability parameters and their standard errors. These results are then used to construct the 90%
CI for the differences in parameter means. A 90% CI is used, since a 5% statistical error is allowed at
both the upper and the lower limits; therefore, the total error is 10%, generating the 90% CI. When
the current rule was adopted in 1986, if both the upper and lower limits of the CI were within 20% of
the reference mean (80% to 120%), the generic product was declared bioequivalent to the reference
product. In 1992, the FDA issued a guidance in which the use of log-transformed data and an upper
limit of 125% were adopted.”).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
24. Id. Additionally, the Investigational New Drug process allows a drug developer to obtain an
exemption from the FDA that permits it to transport the experimental drug for the conduct of clinical
trials. Food & Drug Admin., Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, http://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/investig
ationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm (last updated June 6, 2011).

Feldman&KANTER_22 (S. ALESSI) (Do Not Delete)

December 2012]

12/19/2012 2:58 PM

INCENTIVIZING BIOSIMILARS

63

25

in 1984 to over half of all such sales today. Furthermore, after patent
expiration, most popular small molecule drugs experience swift generic
26
competition. This added competition from generics saves consumers
27
billions of dollars each year. Despite the Hatch-Waxman Act’s strong
encouragement of generic entry, the system has not resulted in reduced
incentives to create new branded drugs. In fact, research and
development spending has increased steadily over the past decade,
28
reaching nearly $67.4 billion in 2010.
While regulations concerning approval of biosimilars undoubtedly
require different considerations from those of generics, the success of the
Hatch-Waxman Act provides a reasonable example of balanced
incentives for both brand and follow-on drug development. As such, the
Act serves as a useful measuring stick for examining the biosimilar
legislation and regulations.

II. Natural Process Variation and Complexity in
Biopharmaceutical Development
One major factor in determining what incentives biosimilars will
require is the relative complexity of such drugs. Biological drugs are
often much more elaborate than the average small molecule drug,
creating greater costs and difficulty both in accurately mimicking a
brand-name biopharmaceutical and in demonstrating just how similar a
29
follow-on biologic actually is. This complexity arises not only from the
greater relative molecular size of biopharmaceuticals, but also from the
structural variation resulting from protein folding and post-translational
30
modifications. These difficulties are further increased by the unique
31
production processes that must be employed to manufacture such drugs.
As a result, biosimilar manufacturers have an innate disadvantage when
compared with generic manufacturers, which may necessitate greater
statutory or administrative incentives for encouraging biosimilar
development.
As mentioned previously, biopharmaceutical drugs are enormously
large and complex molecular structures compared to typical small
molecule drugs. A good example of the relative size of these medications
25. Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competition in
Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation, 18 Int’l J. Econ.
Bus. 177, 181–82 (2011) (noting a current generic market share of 74.5%).
26. Cong. Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected
Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry xii (1998).
27. Id. at ix (noting an estimated savings of $8–10 billion in 1994 alone).
28. PhRMA, supra note 1 at 10–11, 16.
29. FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 4–6.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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is the popular drug Epogen, produced by Amgen. Epogen is a
replication of the human erythropoietin protein, which stimulates the
33
production of red blood cells and is typically used to treat anemia.
34
In 2010, worldwide sales of Epogen exceeded $2.5 billion. The
erythropoietin molecule is made up of 165 amino acids and weighs
35
approximately 30,400 daltons. That makes Epogen 168 times heavier
than the small molecule drug Aspirin, which weighs only about
36
180 daltons—in comparison, Epogen appears massive in scale. Figures 1
and
2 are

illustrations of the amino acid structure of an erythropoietin molecule
(left) compared with an aspirin molecule (at right and not to scale):
37

38

Figures 1 & 2

32. See generally Food & Drug Admin., Procrit Label, Epogen Label (2007) [hereinafter FDA,
Procrit/Epogen]; Amgen, Epogen, http://www.epogen.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
33. See FDA, Procrit/Epogen, supra note 32, at 36. “Anemia is a condition in which you don’t
have enough healthy red blood cells to carry adequate oxygen to your tissues.” Anemia, Mayo Clinic,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/anemia/DS00321 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
34. Brady Huggett et al., Public Biotech 2010—The Numbers, 29 Nature Biotech. 585, 589
(2011).
35. See FDA, Procrit/Epogen, supra note 32, at 36. A dalton is a unit of mass on the molecular
-27
scale, representing approximately 1.660 x 10 kg. Convert Dalton to Atomic Mass Unit, Conversion
Center, http://www.conversioncenter.net/mass-conversion/from-dalton-to-atomic-mass-unit-(amu) (last
visited Oct. 2, 2012).
36. PubChem,
Aspirin-Compound
Summary,
http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/summary/
summary.cgi?cid=2244 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
37. File:HumanEPO.png, Ganfyd, http://www.ganfyd.org/index.php?title=File:HumanEPO.png
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
38. Aspirin @ 3DChem.com, 3DChem, http://www.3dchem.com/molecules.asp?ID=157 (last
visited Oct. 2, 2012).
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Because of the greater size and complexity of protein-based drugs,
they often cannot be synthesized artificially and are instead produced in
39
living organisms such as bacteria or mammalian cell cultures. As a
result, it is more difficult to control and monitor biopharmaceutical
production processes. Furthermore, natural variations and changes in
such bacteria may introduce variation between two processes or even
from one batch to the next. For example, mutations in the DNA of the
producing organisms can result in changes in the protein sequence of the
40
drug. Generic developers do not need to contend with these process
issues, and they are typically able to manufacture a small-molecule drug
through a series of relatively well-characterized chemical reactions,
41
producing a reliable outcome.
Even if a biosimilar manufacturer manages to create a stable
production system that can exactly copy the sequence of amino acids in a
brand biopharmaceutical (referred to as its primary structure), the
resulting biosimilar may have a very different secondary, tertiary, or
quaternary structure (Figure 2), each of which helps to define the
42
protein’s effect on a living organism.
43

Figure 3

39. FDA, Quality Considerations, supra note 13, at 9–10 (“Therapeutic protein products can be
produced by microbial cells (prokaryotic, eukaryotic), cell lines of human or animal origin (e.g.,
mammalian, avian, insect), or tissues derived from animals or plants.”).
40. See, e.g., John W. Drake, A Constant Rate of Spontaneous Mutation in DNA-Based Microbes,
88 Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. USA 7160, 7160–64 (1991) (noting the rates of DNA mutation in various
microbial organisms).
41. Small and Large Molecules: Drugs on a Chemical and Biological Basis, Bayer HealthCare
Science for a Better Life, http://www.bayerpharma.com/en/research-and-development/technologies/
small-and-large-molecules/index.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (discussing the “classic way” of
producing small molecules, the use of “automated synthesis methods” and automated high-throughput
screening to comb through a library of two million small molecules).
42. FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 4–5 (“[E]ven minor structural
differences . . . can significantly affect a protein’s safety, purity, and/or potency . . . .”).
43. A.J.F. Griffiths et al., Modern Genetic Analysis (1999), image available at http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK21385 (hemoglobin protein structure).
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Secondary structures refer to localized protein folding and structures,
tertiary to the interactions between the secondary structures, and
quaternary to interactions between the tertiary structures of two or more
individual protein chains.
A number of factors help to define how a produced protein is
folded, such as enzymatic interactions and the chemistry present in the
44
producing cell. The subsequent purification, processing, and storage of
45
such a protein by a drug manufacturer can further affect its structure.
Some structural changes will not alter the function of a protein, but
46
others may significantly affect the safety and efficacy of a drug.
Even where the bioactivity of a biopharmaceutical is identical to the
natural protein it mimics, undetectable differences can result in
dangerous side effects. One particular danger that may result from such
differences is the possibility of increased immunogenicity. Unlike small
molecule drugs, protein-based drugs are often large enough to be
detected by antibodies, making biological drugs especially vulnerable to
immunogenicity issues. Immunogenicity occurs when patients develop
antibodies against the biologics with which they have been treated,
47
sometimes leading to an immune system response.
44. Christopher M. Dobson, Protein Folding and Misfolding, 426 Nature 884, 884–89 (2003).
45. FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 5 (“Protein modifications and higher order
structure can be affected by environmental conditions, including formulation, light, temperature,
moisture, packaging materials, container closure systems, and delivery device materials.”).
46. FDA, Quality Considerations, supra note 13, at 9 (noting that “minor modifications, such as
N or C terminal truncation” may not affect the safety, purity, or potency of some protein-based drugs).
47. Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (a Lack of) Science: Limitations in Determining Therapeutic
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A good illustration of the danger of biopharmaceutical
48
immunogenicity is the drug Eprex. Eprex is an erythropoietin drug sold
primarily in Europe. The production methodology for Eprex was very
49
similar to that of Epogen. Both drugs had identical amino acid
sequences and were produced in Chinese Hamster Ovary cells, a popular
50
mammalian cell line. Eprex and Epogen were originally formulated,
51
stored, and shipped in human serum albumin. However, in 1998, Eprex
replaced the human serum albumin with polysorbate 80 and glycine in
order to avoid the possible risk of transmitting Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease, the human form of what is commonly referred to as mad cow
52
disease, through the human material. It is not clear how these minor
changes affected the protein drugs, but patients subcutaneously injected
with Eprex experienced an unexpectedly rapid immune response to the
53
drug. The antibodies produced in response to Eprex injection were, in
some cases, cross-reactive with patients’ natural erythropoietin,
essentially triggering an auto-immune response. In other words, the
antibodies produced in response to administration of the biologic began
54
to attack the patient’s own erythropoietin. Because auto-immune
reactions like this are not generally reversible, these patients experienced
a potentially permanent impairment of their own erythropoietin activity,
55
exacerbating their existing anemia. Some of the affected patients were,
however, able to regain some natural erythropoietin activity by
56
undergoing immunosuppressive therapy or a renal allograft. A renal
allograft is a procedure during which a portion of a donor’s kidney is

Equivalence of Follow-On Biologics and Barriers to Their Approval and Commercialization, 9 Stan.
Tech. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2012).
48. Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Innovation Must Come
Before Price Competition, B.C. Intell. Prop. & Tech. F., 2009, at 3.
49. Songpon Deechongkit et al., Biophysical Comparability of the Same Protein from Different
Manufacturers: A Case Study Using Epoeitin Alfa from Epogen® and Eprex®, 95 J. Pharm. Sci. 1931,
1932 (2006).
50. Id.
51. Charles L. Bennett et al., Long-Term Outcome of Individuals with Pure Red Cell Aplasia and
Antierythropoietin Antibodies in Patients Treated with Recombinant Epoetin: A Follow-Up Report
from the Research on Adverse Drug Events and Reports (RADAR) Project, 106 Blood 3343, 3343–44
(2012).
52. Id.
53. See Sahr, supra note 48, at 3 (citing Denis Cournoyer et al., Anti-Erythropoietin AntibodyMediated Pure Red Cell Aplasia After Treatment with Recombinant Erythropoietin Products:
Recommendations for Minimization of Risk, 15 J. Am. Soc. Nephrol. 2728, 2728–29 (2004)); see also
Deechongkit et al., supra note 49, at 1939–40 (noting that Eprex is less likely to re-fold when exposed
to extreme conditions than Epogen and suggesting some potential structural differences).
54. Sahr, supra note 48, at 3.
55. Id.
56. See Nicole Casadevall et al., Pure Red-Cell Aplasia and Antierythropoietin Antibodies in
Patients Treated with Recombinant Erythropoietin, 346 New Eng. J. Med. 469, 470 (2002).
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grafted onto the kidney of a recipient in the hopes of restoring kidney
function of the recipient.
57
Figure 4

for

The
post-

potential

translational modification of a protein is another concern with
biosimilars. Post-translational modification occurs when enzymes present
in a cell add various non-protein molecules to the protein structure of the
58
drug. The addition of these non-protein molecules includes, for
example,
sugars
(glycosylation)
and
phosphate
groups
59
Like structural changes, post-translational
(phosphorylation).
modification can affect the function, stability, bioavailability, and
60
immunogenicity of a protein. For example, improper glycosylation of

57. Image courtesy of Mark Wormald, Pauline Rudd, and Raymond, Dwek Glycobiology
Institute, Department of Biochemistry, University of Oxford, UK.
58. Sahr, supra note 48, at 3.
59. FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 9–10.
60. FDA, Quality Considerations, supra note 13, at 12 (“[B]ioavailability can be dramatically
altered by subtle differences in glycoform distribution or other post-translation modifications.”); Nigel
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human erythropoietin (pictured in glycosylated form in Figure 4) can
61
greatly reduce the drug’s intended effect. Variations of erythropoietin
missing even a single glycosylation site have been shown to have up to
62
Additionally, differences between
80% less biological activity.
producing cell lines may cause variation in post-translational
modification, and a given cell may modify proteins differently based on
63
different conditions or stimuli.
Given that these issues are unique to biopharmaceutical drugs, the
preclinical development costs per biological drug candidate are higher
64
than those of small molecule cousins. Studies have estimated the
preclinical costs for biological drugs to be 46% higher than those of small
65
molecule drugs. In light of these difficulties, and given the HatchWaxman Act’s success in creating effective generic incentives, an
approach similar to Hatch-Waxman’s should, in theory, help to mitigate
these greater costs and establish similar incentives for both the biosimilar
and generic markets. The greater safety and efficacy risks of biological
drugs do suggest that the process will always be more cumbersome for
follow-on biological drugs than for generics. Nevertheless, the HatchWaxman framework provides a reasonable model.

III. Lack of Clarity in the Requirements for Proving
Biosimilarity Under the Biosimilars Act and Draft Guidances
The Biosimilars Act was enacted as part of the recent Patient
66
Protection and Affordable Care Act. Similar in spirit to the HatchWaxman Act, the Biosimilars Act creates an abbreviated approval
pathway for biological products that can be shown to be sufficiently
67
similar to a previously approved biological drug. While the framework
set forth by the Biosimilars Act and the FDA’s recent draft guidances is
certainly better than no framework at all, the incentives provided for
biosimilar development are less robust than incentives for generic

Jenkins et al., Post-Translational Modifications of Recombinant Proteins: Significance for
Biopharmaceuticals, 39 Molecular Biotech. 113, 113–18 (2008).
61. Evelyne Delorme et al., Role of Glycosylation on the Secretion and Biological Activity of
Erythropoietin, 31 Biochemistry 9871, 9871–76 (1992); Syamalima Dubé et al., Glycosylation at
Specific Sites of Erythropoietin Is Essential for Biosynthesis, Secretion, and Biological Function,
253 Biochemistry 17516, 17516–21 (1988).
62. Delorme et al., supra note 61, at 9871; Dubé et al., supra note 61, at 17516.
63. Gary Walsh & Roy Jefferis, Post-Translational Modifications in the Context of Therapeutic
Proteins, 24 Nature Biotech. 1241, 1241–52 (2006).
64. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 4, at 472–77.
65. Id. at 475.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006).
67. Id.
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production under the Hatch-Waxman Act, and are unlikely to be
sufficient to attract much activity in the biosimilars market.
Under § 351(k) of the Biosimilars Act (“351(k) application”), a
biosimilar manufacturer must demonstrate that its product is biosimilar
68
to a prior approved reference product. In order to meet this standard,
the statute requires that an applicant must show that the two products
are “highly similar” and have “no clinically meaningful differences” in
69
their safety or efficacy. The statute does not define what constitutes a
clinically meaningful difference, nor does it say what is required for two
products to be highly similar. Given the lack of clarity in both of these
dimensions, biosimilar manufacturers cannot anticipate whether they will
be required to undergo only simple studies regarding protein structure,
70
71
pharmacodynamics, and pharmacokinetics, or whether they will have
to invest in potentially cost-prohibitive clinical trials.
In its guidances on the Biosimilars Act the FDA provides a stepwise
72
approach for demonstrating biosimilarity. The goal of this approach is
to front-load the costs of demonstrating biosimilarity and to reduce the
73
need for clinical trials. The guidances note that the first step in showing
biosimilarity is a comprehensive structural analysis of the protein-based
74
drug. Greater structural characterization will increase the justification
75
for smaller, more targeted tests going forward. Next, a sponsor must
76
perform functional assays that measure the activity of the biologic drug.
While the resulting data may change the scope of the subsequent tests,
the guidances imply that regardless of the outcome of the functional and
structural tests, there is a high likelihood that animal or human trials will
77
still be required. Following the structural and functional analysis, the
guidances suggest that a sponsor design and perform animal studies to test

68. Id. § 262(k).
69. Id. § 262(i)(2).
70. Pharmacodynamic data describe the physiological effect of an administered pharmacological
agent. Generally, these data are used to determine the appropriate dose for a drug. See
Pharmacodynamics Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pharmacodynamics (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
71. Pharmacokinetic data describe the levels of drug that remain in the body over time. See
Pharmacokinetics Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pharmacokinetics (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
72. See FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 7–8.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 8–10.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 10. Functional assays are useful for showing the mechanism of action for a drug.
Evidence that the mechanism of action is identical between two drugs helps to narrow the scope of
future tests to demonstrate biosimilarity. Id.
77. Id. at 11, 12.
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the toxicity, pharmacokinetics, pharmacodynamics, and immunogenicity of
78
the sponsored drug.
Next, the guidances discuss the need for human clinical trials, noting
that a sponsor must demonstrate that “there are no clinically meaningful
differences between the biological product and the reference product in
79
terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product.” In order to
accomplish this, the guidances recommend conducting human studies on
80
immunogenicity,
pharmacokinetics,
and
pharmacodynamics.
Unfortunately, the lack of current tools to adequately characterize
complex biopharmaceuticals almost guarantees the need for at least some
clinical testing. In a 2007 statement before the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Dr. Janet Woodcock, the Deputy
Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer of the FDA, noted that the
“ability to predict immunogenicity of a protein product, particularly the
81
more complex proteins, is extremely limited.” Because of this
limitation, Dr. Woodcock concluded that “some degree of clinical
assessment of a new product’s immunogenic potential will ordinarily be
82
needed.”
Finally, the guidances provide that if there are “residual
uncertainties” about the biosimilarity of a drug, clinical studies for safety
83
and efficacy should be performed. These are the most expensive and
time-consuming categories of clinical trials because they require the
measurement of clinical endpoint results which for some drugs may take
a long period of time, depending on its mechanism of action and
84
associated risks. The guidances do not provide the extent of the
required clinical trials, and instead provide factors that “may influence
the type and extent of the comparative clinical safety and effectiveness
85
data needed.” These factors include, for example, the complexity of the
reference product, the extent to which differences between the brand and
biosimilar predict differences in clinical outcomes, the extent to which
human pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics predict clinical

78. Id.
79. Id. at 12 (quoting § 7002(b)(3) of the Affordable Care Act, adding § 351(i)(2) of the Public
Health Services Act).
80. Id.
81. Follow-On Protein Products: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, Deputy Comm’r, Chief Medical Officer, Food &
Drug Admin.).
82. Id.
83. FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 16.
84. See PhRMA, supra note 1, at 13.
85. FDA, Scientific Considerations, supra note 6, at 16.
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outcomes, the extent of clinical experience with the reference product,
86
and the extent of clinical experience with the proposed product.
If extensive safety and efficacy clinical testing is required, it might
be cost-prohibitive for biosimilar manufacturers. At some point, it may
simply make more sense to apply for a new drug application, which
brings considerably more freedom than a biosimilar designation.
Furthermore, the FDA has not clarified what may constitute a residual
uncertainty that requires such clinical testing—although it has listed
some factors that might go into the consideration—nor has it defined
87
how such a determination will be made. As a practical matter, from a
scientific viewpoint, there will always be some uncertainty as to whether
two complex molecules are completely identical, and the FDA has stated
that “current analytical methodology may not be able to detect all
88
relevant structural and functional differences between two proteins.” In
effect, this could mean that most or all biosimilar drugs will have to
undergo some clinical trials.
Given the expansive testing requirements under the new guidances,
the uncertainty over whether efficacy and safety clinical trials will be
required, and the vagueness of the “no clinically meaningful differences”
standard, it seems likely that biosimilar drugs will take much longer to
approve and cost much more money than the average small molecule
generic drug. Considering the high cost of clinical trials, even a few such
studies might cost tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, compared to
the approval of a generic small molecule drug which is a much simpler
89
and less expensive process. Under the ANDA approval process, a small
molecule drug manufacturer need only show that its drug delivers the
same active ingredient to the blood at the same rate as the brand drug in
90
twenty-four to thirty-six healthy volunteers.
The FDA could remove some of these uncertainties by establishing
clearer guidelines for the approval process and by defining key terms
such as “residual uncertainties” and “clinically meaningful differences.”
Given today’s scientific tools and understanding, it would be difficult for
the FDA to quantitatively define what positive factors will lead to
approval of a follow-on biologic. Accordingly, it is understandable that
the FDA would want to set forth very broad guidelines so that it
maintains the greatest amount of discretion. However, the FDA could

86. Id.
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id. at 5.
89. See Dimasi et al., supra note 1, at 151.
90. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.
gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/
AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics (last updated Sept. 7, 2012).
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maintain its discretionary totality-of-the-evidence approach while still
providing biosimilar manufacturers with better approval guidelines. One
way that this could be accomplished is by setting forth conditions that
would result in the rejection of a biosimilar. For example, the FDA could
set limits on the type and frequency of primary-sequence differences in a
biosimilar or maximum differences in bioavailability. Any biosimilar with
characteristics outside of the tolerated range of differences would very
likely be rejected. While this approach is not as useful to a manufacturer
as definite approval conditions, it would provide an opportunity for
biosimilar manufacturers to gauge the viability of their drug during the
evaluation process. Any range or other quantifiable element would allow
businesses to better calculate and manage their risk.
The FDA recently provided a good analogy for looking at failure
conditions in biosimilar approval. In February, Dr. Rachel Sherman,
Associate Director for Medical Policy at the Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, delivered a presentation explaining the FDA’s guidances
91
and stepwise totality of the evidence approach to proving biosimilarity.
Her presentation included a sketch of an elephant that represented a
brand biopharmaceutical drug (labeled “A” in Figure 5), and several
other sketches each representing an analytical or clinical study
performed by a biosimilar applicant, coming together to provide a more
complete picture of the drug candidate (labeled “B–E”).
92

Figure 5

91. See generally Rachel E. Sherman, Biosimilar Biological Products: Biosimilar Guidance
Webinar (2012).
92. Id. at 8.
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Using this analogy, it was noted that the appearance of a beak or
fins when the applicant expects to see an elephant might inform an
applicant at an early stage that their product will not qualify for
93
approval. While humans are well qualified to recognize a beak or fin,
determining whether a structural difference in a complex protein
constitutes a minor, unimportant change or a major, prohibitive
modification is not so simple. If the FDA helps to define what types of
changes are not likely to be acceptable, biosimilar manufacturers will be
in a better position to evaluate the potential success or failure of their
drug and make more informed decisions about whether to continue with
their drug candidate or to go back to the drawing board.

IV. Interchangeability Under the Biosimilars Act and Draft
Guidances
Under the Biosimilars Act, an applicant may attempt to show that a
94
An
biosimilar is “interchangeable” with the original drug.
interchangeable biological drug, in theory, would enjoy similar benefits
95
to those of generic small molecule drugs. For example, the Biosimilars
Act allows an interchangeable biosimilar to be substituted for its
96
reference product without the approval of a health care provider.
However, proving interchangeability can be very difficult, and the
substitution provisions may conflict with some state substitution statutes
that are better adapted for small molecule drugs.
A. Obtaining Interchangeability Status Is Difficult.
Interchangeability status is achieved by demonstrating:
1) biosimilarity to the original drug, 2) that the drug is expected to
produce the same clinical results as the original brand-name drug, and
3) that repeated administration of the drug will not reduce its efficacy or
increase its toxicity or side effects in a way that is beyond what is
97
expected from the brand-name drug. Essentially, the interchangeable
drug must be at least as effective as the brand drug and have no greater
side effects with repeated dosage.
While this is a highly sought-after status, the guidances make it clear
that interchangeability for biosimilars is a long way off. In one of the
guidances, the FDA notes that it is possible for an applicant to obtain a
determination of interchangeability in an original 351(k) application, but

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id.
42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2006).
See id. § 262(i).
Id. § 262(i)(3).
Id. § 262(k)(4).
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that “[a]t this time, it would be difficult as a scientific matter for a
prospective biosimilar applicant to establish interchangeability” in such
an application “given the statutory standard for interchangeability and
98
the sequential nature of that assessment.”
Without an easy pathway to substitution, biosimilar drugs may not
be able to capture market share as effectively as small-molecule generic
drugs can, which could result in higher overall prices or delays in price
reduction for the average consumer. Because small differences in
biosimilar drugs are likely to exist, however, allowing substitution
without a showing of clinical identity could result in unacceptable safety
issues. As a result, the stringent requirements for interchangeability
status may be necessary to protect patient safety.
B. State Laws May Interfere with the Substitutability of
Interchangeable Biopharmaceuticals.
Substitutability is one way that a generic drug can quickly capture a
large market share. However, many state laws are not yet adapted for
use with biopharmaceuticals, and this can create conflicts with
interchangeability benefits under the Biosimilars Act. For example,
section 4073 of the California Business and Professions Code permits
California pharmacists to exchange generic drugs for the brand name
99
without permission from the prescribing doctor. However, the statute
requires that the substituted drug have the “same active chemical
ingredients,” which is more restrictive than the definition of
100
interchangeability. As described above, biosimilars are rarely exact
copies of brand-name biological drugs and often contain undetectable
differences, which make the notion of “same active chemical ingredients”
a poor fit for biologics.
This issue may be a source of short-term uncertainty, as it will likely
be resolved in time by each individual state legislature as they update
their substitution laws or enact new ones to deal with interchangeable
biosimilars. However, in the meantime, prospective biosimilar
manufacturers will not be able to predict how states will treat their drug
if the manufacturers achieve interchangeability status. This issue could
be remedied quickly by a federal law preempting state substitution laws.
Congress, however, allowed states to design their own substitutions laws
with respect to generics and may choose to adopt the same approach
with biosimilars.

98. FDA, Biosimilars, supra note 13, at 11.
99. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 4073 (Deering 2012).
100. Id. § 4073(a); see Marsha N. Cohen & Sami Sedghani, Pharmacy Law for California
Pharmacists, 188–89 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing California generic substitution laws).
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V. Exclusivity Under the Biosimilars Act and Draft Guidances
A. There Are Several Forms of Exclusivity for Brand-Name
Manufacturers.
The Biosimilars Act provides several forms of exclusivity for brandname biopharmaceutical manufacturers. First, the Act prohibits the filing
of biosimilar applications under section 351(k) until four years after the
101
approval of the brand drug. This is similar to the five-year exclusivity
102
afforded under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Additionally, the Biosimilars
Act prohibits FDA approval of any follow-on application until at least
twelve years after the date on which its reference product is first
103
licensed. Finally, if the FDA requests pediatric studies from an
applicant and the applicant completes those studies, it will receive an
additional extension of six months exclusivity for both of the above104
mentioned periods.
In theory, these expansive periods of exclusivity would help a brandname manufacturer recover the greater costs associated with developing
biopharmaceuticals, assuming that the drug’s patents expire prior to the
end of the exclusivity. However, studies show that overall costs in
producing a new brand biological drug are lower than those associated
105
with producing a new small-molecule drug. One potential explanation
for this is that biopharmaceutical candidates are usually copies or
variations of natural human proteins, and so they are better adapted for
their given purpose. Additionally, in the case of biopharmaceuticals that
simply copy human proteins, researchers have a blueprint upon which to
work and do not need to screen a molecular database, resulting in fewer
failed candidates. Given that brand biological drug development costs
are lower than those of brand small-molecule drugs, such a long period
of exclusivity for brand biological drug manufacturers may be excessive
and may serve only to unduly delay biosimilar entry into the market. The
Biosimilars Act was added at the last minute to the massive 2010 health
care reform bill and lacks the extensive legislative history that would
normally accompany legislation of this complexity. As a result, the logic
for the twelve-year period is absent, and Congress may want to revisit
this issue once it has gained experience with the effects of the legislation.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(E)(ii) (2007).
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A).
Id. § 262(m)(2)–(3).
See generally PhRMA, supra note 1.
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B. There Is Exclusivity for Biosimilar Manufacturers if Their
Follow-On Biologic Is the First to Be Deemed Interchangeable
with a Reference Product.
The Biosimilars Act also provides exclusivity for the first follow-on
106
biologic that is deemed interchangeable with a reference product. This
exclusivity lasts for up to one year, but may be shortened under some
107
circumstances. Unlike the Hatch-Waxman Act’s generic exclusivity,
which promises exclusivity to the first filing parties, interchangeability
exclusivity applies to the first drug that is deemed by the FDA to be
108
interchangeable. While this does solve the common Hatch-Waxman
issue of multiple first-to-file manufacturers who each claim exclusivity, it
creates a situation where biopharmaceutical manufacturers must invest
in creating the drug and pursuing its approval as both biosimilar and
interchangeable without knowing whether it will benefit from a period of
exclusivity.
One potential solution to this problem is to divide the approval
process into two parts, one for biosimilar approval and the next for drugs
that have already been deemed biosimilar and wish to apply for
interchangeability. Under this approach, the FDA could provide
exclusivity to the first party to file for interchangeability status. The
variable period of time required to complete the biosimilar approval
process would help to space out the manufacturers, preventing the
multiple first filer issues seen under Hatch-Waxman. It would also permit
manufacturers to foresee whether they would have some form of
exclusivity before investing heavily in the clinical trials needed to obtain
interchangeability, allowing them to make better risk management
decisions.

VI. Patent Litigation Under the Biosimilars Act and Draft
Guidances
The Biosimilars Act, like the Hatch-Waxman Act, makes it an act of
artificial patent infringement to submit an application for a biosimilar
109
The
when its reference product is still under patent coverage.
Biosimilars Act also sets forth a complicated set of requirements for both

106. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6).
107. Id. (providing for up to one year of exclusivity, cut short by the earliest of: 18 months after a
final court decision (including non-prejudicial dismissal) of an infringement action against one of the
applicant’s patents, 42 months after the approval of the first applicant’s 351(k) application if a patent
suit is ongoing, or 18 months after the approval of the applicant’s 351(k) application if no patent
infringement suit was brought).
108. Id.
109. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006).
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the biosimilar and brand manufacturer in a patent suit. However,
because the statute is relatively young and complex, there are numerous
uncertainties in how it will be applied and how it will interact with
existing laws. Additionally, the complicated procedures appear to favor
the brand manufacturer. This Article illustrates several striking
uncertainties regarding the patent litigation dance delineated in the
Biosimilars Act, but it will take years of experience with litigation under
that act to truly work out all of the dimensions of the interactions. As
always, uncertainty brings risk and a corresponding reluctance to enter
the field.
A. The Disclosure Requirements for a Biosimilar Applicant Are
Unclear.
In order to keep brand-name drug manufacturers informed about
biosimilar applications that may infringe their patents, the Biosimilars
111
Act places several disclosure requirements on the biosimilar applicant.
For example, shortly after a biosimilar application has been accepted by
the FDA, the applicant is required to provide a copy of the application
and “such other information that describes the process or processes used
to manufacture the biological product that is the subject of such
112
application” to the reference sponsor. However, the statute does not
further define what constitutes “other information,” and it is not clear
how a court will interpret the statute. Conceivably, an applicant might be
forced to provide trade secrets or other confidential information. In
particular, although pharmaceutical companies are required to disclose
trade secrets to the FDA, the FDA maintains confidentiality for many
aspects of those secrets and does not reveal them to third parties. With
biologics, however, the biosimilar manufacturer would need information
about the process used by the original biologic manufacturer in order to
sufficiently replicate it, which could require the disclosure of trade
secrets.
B. The Biosimilars Litigation Process Is Complex and Appears to
Favor Brand Manufacturers Rather than Follow-On
Developers.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l), when the biosimilar manufacturer applies
for approval, the parties must engage in a complex pre-suit “Patent
113
Information Exchange” process. This process provides for initial

110.
111.
112.
113.

42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
Id. § 262(l)(2)(A).
Id.
Id. § 262(l).
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litigation over essential patents and permits subsequent litigation or
court action on the remaining patents only after resolution of that initial
suit. The reference product sponsor must first provide a list of patents
114
that it believes it can assert against the biosimilar applicant. The parties
then negotiate on which essential patents will be subject to the first
115
round of litigation. If the parties do not agree on which patents shall be
litigated, the applicant may specify a number of patents that the
116
reference sponsor may assert. In each case, the reference sponsor must
117
assert at least one patent. The statute prohibits declaratory judgments
for the un-asserted patents during this first round of litigation, though
118
they are still infringed. A party may only move for declaratory
judgment on these remaining patents after completion of the first round,
119
or upon a 180-day advance notice that the generic intends to market.
Even when declaratory judgment becomes available, there is no
guarantee that a court will grant it. Accordingly, a brand manufacturer
may have un-asserted patents that it can still assert against the biosimilar
applicant. A biosimilar manufacturer in such a situation most likely
would not want to begin producing and selling its drug, given that actual
damages might begin to accrue. In other words, the risk would be too
great, and the biosimilar might choose to stay out of the market.
C. A Potential Conflict Exists Between the Patent Statute and the
Required Patent Negotiation Process Under the Biosimilars Act.
The complex litigation process provided for by the Biosimilars Act
may conflict with modifications that the Biosimilars Act made to the
120
patent statute. For example, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C), the
infringement of the sponsor’s to-be-asserted patents exists as soon as an
application for a biosimilar is filed. However, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) does not
seem to prohibit an immediate lawsuit. Instead, it provides a number of
situations where a manufacturer “shall bring an action” in response to
121
different outcomes of the negotiation process. As a result, it may be
possible for a brand manufacturer to sue the applicant upon providing its
list of asserted patents and thus circumvent the rest of the exchange and
122
negotiation process. It is not clear how a court would handle an

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. § 262(l)(3).
Id. § 262(l)(4).
Id. § 262(l)(5).
Id.
Id. § 262(l)(9)(A).
Id. § 262(l)(9)(B).
See 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(2)(C) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(6).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e); 42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
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attempt to sue outside of the litigation framework set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 262(l), or whether the remaining provisions of § 272(l) would remain in
effect for such litigation.

VII. Higher Costs Due to Inhibition of Biosimilar and
Interchangeable Biopharmaceutical Market Entry
If biosimilar drugs are inhibited from entering the marketplace, the
123
price of biosimilars will likely remain high due to a lack of competition.
Studies have shown that the entry of a first generic small molecule drug
124
into the market actually causes the price of the brand drug to go higher.
One reason for this increase in brand cost is that there is a segment of the
market that is price insensitive and will almost always choose the brand
125
name. When a generic enters the market, it captures a great segment of
the price sensitive segment, and so the brand drugs capitalize on the
126
remaining price insensitive segment by increasing prices. Furthermore,
the first generic to market, having little or no other generic competition,
tends to keep its prices relatively high as well, though somewhat lower
127
than the brand drug. It is not until multiple generics enter the market
that there is sufficient competition to cause the prices to fall
128
dramatically. If this experience holds true for the biopharmaceutical
market, in order for consumers to significantly benefit from the biosimilars
licensing process, an application under the Biosimilars Act will need to be
sufficiently cost-effective and dependable to entice the development of
multiple biosimilar products for each brand biopharmaceutical.
Conclusion
The natural complexity, difficulty, and added costs in developing a
biosimilar and attempting to mimic a reference brand drug present
challenges to biosimilar market entry. While this stems partially from our
scientific inability to cheaply and effectively create biosimilars, the FDA
can help to alleviate these issues by providing incentives for biosimilar
development and by providing a well-defined biosimilar approval
pathway.

123. See Henry G. Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 Managerial &
Decision Econ. 439, 439 (2007).
124. See Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals¸
6 J. Econ. Mgmt. Strategy 75, 79, 89–90 (1997); see also Joel Lexchin, The Effect of Generic
Competition on the Price of Brand-Name Drugs, 68 Health Pol’y 47, 52–53 (2004).
125. See Frank & Salkever, supra note 124, at 76–77.
126. Id.
127. Lexchin, supra note 124, at 47–48.
128. See id.; see also Wendy H. Schacht, Cong. Research Serv., R 41483, Follow-On-Biologics:
The Law and Intellectual Property Issues 16 (201i); Frank & Salkever, supra note 124, at 75–90.
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Unfortunately, the Biosimilars Act and its guidances raise a number
of uncertainties for biosimilar approval and do not yet provide strong
incentives for biosimilars. The approval process may be improved
through future guidances that define key terms such as “residual
uncertainties” and “no clinically meaningful differences.” Some of the
uncertainty can also be alleviated by providing more quantitative
guidelines for approval, such as required bioavailability levels. Such
guidelines need not guarantee approval and would still be useful to a
manufacturer if they help to define situations where a biosimilar
application is likely to be denied. While there would still be some
uncertainty, manufacturers would be in a better informed position to
evaluate their chance of obtaining biosimilarity status.
The requirements for interchangeability status under the Biosimilars
Act also present hurdles to biosimilar development. The status, which is
required for substitution of the biosimilar for a brand prescription, is
difficult to achieve, expensive to prove, and might conflict with existing
state laws. While instituting strict requirements for interchangeability is
necessary for public safety, the great difficulty in achieving the status
increases biosimilar costs. Furthermore, biosimilar manufacturers cannot
rely on first interchangeable drug exclusivity until interchangeability
status has actually been awarded. This might be remedied by instituting
first-to-file interchangeability exclusivity, much like generic exclusivity
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, and by separating interchangeability
approval into a separate process to be completed only after biosimilarity
is achieved.
The expansive exclusivity for brand drugs under the Biosimilars Act
is another potential hindrance to biosimilar market entry. Given the
relative costs between new small molecule and new biopharmaceutical
drugs, a period of exclusivity more in line with that provided to brand
small molecule drugs under the Hatch-Waxman Act seems more
appropriate. In other words, the twelve-year exclusivity for branded
biologics seems relatively long given the greater expense and difficulties
that biosimilars will face in order to obtain approval.
Most important, litigation under the Biosimilars Act is complex and
appears to favor the brand manufacturer. Adding to the troubles, the
litigation statutory procedures have not yet been fully interpreted by the
courts. These factors lower the incentives for challenging a brand
manufacturer’s patents and thus may slow biosimilar market entry.
In the current atmosphere, many companies considering entering
the biosimilars market may decide to forgo the pathway offered by
Congress. The alternative for these companies is to create what are
known as biodifferents or biobetters. These are variations on the original
branded drug that would not be subject to the Biosimilars Act at all.
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Such companies would have to do all of the extensive testing required for
new drugs under FDA regulations. Although this would increase the
costs of production, these companies would benefit from the greater
certainty of the process for new drugs over the many uncertainties in the
Biologics Act, as well as the better pricing available for a new drug. The
loser, of course, is the consumer. It is doubtful that biobetters and
biosimilars will have the same price-lowering effects as generics. These
drugs will be patented themselves, creating full exclusivity in the market.
If so, prices will remain high in the biological drug space. It would be
unfortunate if the tremendous energy and creativity invested in designing
and implementing the Biosimilars Act were to have very little effect in
the long run.
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